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Abstract 
An absence of civil war and other significant sub-state violence makes Zambia an 
exceptional although not unique case in central-southern Africa. The literature 
devoted to explaining civil war has grown dramatically in recent years, but while it 
pays much attention to sub-Saharan Africa only rarely does it investigate 
counterfactual cases like Zambia. Similarly the growing field of research into post-
conflict reconstruction fails to capture the distinct features of persistently low-conflict 
situations where many of the predisposing conditions for violent conflict might seem 
to be present. This paper examines Zambia’s experience against a background of 
general theories that try to explain conflict. It is an “interpretative case study”. The 
paper proceeds by substantiating Zambia’s claim to a relatively peaceful record and 
introduces ideas of conflict and conflict theories, before arguing that no single general 
theory dwelling on just one primary “cause” will suffice to explain Zambian 
exceptionalism. The precise mix of arguments differs for each one Zambia’s three 
republican eras, as the potential threats to peace have themselves evolved over the 
period since independence. The paper’s main theoretical claim is that over time the 
explanation is both multi-layered and dynamic. That said, certain features do stand 
out, most notably an inherited political culture that is predisposed against the violent 
resolution of conflict and continues to insulate the country against social and 
economic traumas and democratic shortcomings. 
 
Introduction 
The new world disorder that succeeded the post-Cold War era has placed a spotlight 
on the prevalence of sub-state violence, just as the threat and incidence of major inter-
state violence seemed to be in retreat. While not everyone believes the end of the Cold 
War is responsible for fuelling internal conflict (the so called “decompression 
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effect”), theorising about the origins of such conflict has increased dramatically.1 
Between 1981 and 1996 nearly half of Africa’s states experienced significant episodes 
of violent conflict between government and opposition groups, such that by 1998 
some 4 million people may have lost their lives as a direct result. At least 92 
attempted military coups have been recorded, affecting 29 African countries 
(Goldsmith 2001: 128). Sub-Saharan Africa is unusual among regions in seeing no 
decline in the incidence of civil war in the last decade or so (Collier et al. 2003: 114-
5). Central-southern Africa fits this pattern. This paper seeks to make sense of one of 
the exceptions - Zambia, a country possessing land borders with eight countries half 
of which have experienced significant levels of political violence including civil war 
in the years since achieving independence (1964). Rather than being a study in 
comparative analysis, the aim is to apply general propositions to the end of 
illuminating a single country, namely what Lijphart (1971: 692) calls an 
“interpretative” case study. While case studies naturally have limitations for larger 
endeavours in theory building, country studies nevertheless offer a legitimate focus of 
study in their own right, no matter how representative or unrepresentative they might 
be in regard to a larger set. 
 
Zambia is an interesting case not least because so many of its immediate neighbours 
have experienced significant violent conflict. Mozambique’s long running internal 
war came to an end only at the start of the 1990s. Angola’s civil war ended only in 
2002, with the death of the rebel leader, Jonas Savimbi. The so-called Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) – formerly Zaire - descended into violent conflict in the 
mid-1990s. In Zimbabwe considerable violence characterised the black majority 
government’s repression of ethnic opposition in Matabeleland in the 1980s, and 
violence towards the political opposition is now routine. Namibia too gained its 
independence only after armed struggle and since then has witnessed violent 
opposition in the Caprivi Strip. Further south, there was bloodshed during South 
Africa’s struggle for black majority rule, although the country is now a model of 
stability, while to Zambia’s north large-scale bloodletting bordering on genocide 
marks the post-colonial era in Burundi and Rwanda. Generally speaking a “bad 
neighbourhood” increases the risk of violent domestic conflict, and while Zambia’s 
relatively peaceful existence is not unique in the region, only Malawi, Tanzania and 
the relatively prosperous Botswana share its comparatively tranquil record. Routine 
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compilations of countries that have crossed a notable threshold denoting civil war, 
rebellion, revolution or other forms of violent protest such as successful military 
coups invariably leave Zambia as one of the few  anomalous cases.2
 
Political violence is a contested concept.  The requirement that it must have both 
political effects and political causes could be debated at length, as can arguments that 
the motives themselves must have some particular political content such as the 
overthrow of a political regime. Here the focus is on armed conflict, not all the other 
forms of “violence” such as famine, disease or gender discrimination that can 
seriously jeopardise human security and well-being. Goldsmith (2001: 130) defines an 
episode of political violence as an inter- or intrastate armed conflict involving at least 
500 fatalities. Most conventional accounts of civil war - a major manifestation of 
political violence - specify a thousand combat-related deaths or more. The intention 
behind violence can be to preserve the status quo, as when an unpopular government 
resorts to force (“demicide” being an extreme example), as well as more radical 
initiatives like a popular revolution. In practice political violence is ubiquitous, found 
even in established democracies like Israel, India and Ulster, but the level or amount 
varies widely. 
 
It would be wrong to say Zambia has a completely clean record. When the largely 
peaceful struggle for self-rule was gaining momentum in the late 1950s there were 
hints of mob violence, most notably the Cha Cha Cha episode (1961). In 1964 the 
Governor of Northern Rhodesia imposed a state of public emergency to counter the 
fanatical Lenshina movement (Lumpa church) in rural areas of the North East. Its 
followers have been variously estimated between 50,000 and100,000 peasants; and 
numerous riotous incidents involving both the authorities and supporters of the United 
National Independence Party (UNIP) claimed as many as 1,500 lives (Binsbergen 
1976). Roberts (1979: 551) says in late December 1963 large-scale fighting ‘bordered 
on civil war’. Since then there have been several unsuccessful coup attempts (1990; 
1997) and coup plots (1980; 1983; 1988). And from the mid-1970s to 1982 Adamson 
Mushala waged guerilla war against the one-party state, with support from exiles 
trained in South Africa.  Riots in 1986 left 15 people dead. In June 1990 over 30 lives 
were lost in Lusaka, the capital, when the authorities used force to disperse rioters and 
looters – evidence of increasing popular discontent. A failed coup attempt followed 
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within days. The years since the return to political pluralism (1991) have witnessed a 
number of suspicious deaths of prominent politicians.3 And in some most fiercely 
contested electoral arenas organised bands of youthful cadres mainly of the governing 
party (Movement for Multi-party Democracy) have used intimidating behaviour, 
reminiscent of some of their predecessors in UNIP in Zambia’s First Republic (1964-
71). In 2001, efforts to mobilise support for amending the constitution to allow 
President Chiluba to run for a third term looked for a time as though there might be a 
violent outcome, before Chiluba reconfirmed his intention to leave office.  
 
Nevertheless, by comparison with many of Zambia’s neighbours and, perhaps more 
significant, when seen against a background of the potential threats to peace, such as 
severe and prolonged deterioration in social and economic conditions, Zambia looks 
unusually stable and peaceful.4 Zambia is such an interesting case precisely because 
at first sight it looks vulnerable to several of the more prominent features identified in 
the general theories that purport to explain violent conflict.  
 
Conflict: Ideas and Explanations   
Although many African countries have experienced serious conflict, violence is not 
the norm everywhere. Local differences in the nature, origins, and sustaining factors 
of conflict could be highly significant, making each case look special in their own 
way and Zambia appear not so extraordinary. For instance Namibia’s difficulties with 
a relatively few secessionists in the Caprivi Strip hardly compares with the 
disintegration and external military involvement (most notably Ugandan invasion) in 
the vast DRC; genocide in Rwanda is different again. Thus not only is the explanation 
of conflict in all these cases unlikely to be identical, but in order to understand more 
peaceful cases like Zambia there may be several points of contrast that are relevant. 
 
Violent conflict is not synonymous with political instability, although the two may be 
reciprocally connected. Weak government unable to control unruly subjects may be a 
factor in internal war, but that too requires explanation (David 1997). According to 
Fearon and Laitin (2003) state weakness offers the most compelling explanation of 
insurgency, but what defines weakness, is there some crucial threshold and can states 
sometimes be too powerful for internal peace? State collapse definitely conjures up 
scenes of violent conflict, but the opposite is not necessarily true. Contrarily, Ayoob 
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(1998: 42) reasons “internal war” is positively related less to state decline than to 
state-making and state formation, which he argues involve imposition and 
accumulation of power against the forces of resistance. So, there are crucial 
distinctions between whether it is the state (or perhaps just one branch) that is 
responsible for violence, or some distinct social group which may be targeting other 
groups or assaulting the political order more generally. In principle a violently 
oppressive regime, rebellion, popular revolution, military coups d’etat, inter-
communal warfare, secession pursued through armed struggle, guerrilla warfare, and 
economically-motivated violent plunder may all be theorised in distinct ways.  
 
Furthermore, conflict is a continuum extending from total war to “low-intensity” 
violence; from highly localised to nationwide incidents, either intermittent or 
sustained. Different reasons may be adduced to explain the origins of conflict and 
then its persistence or recurrence. The underlying conditions enabling conflict to 
occur or facilitating it may not be those that predispose a society to violent conflict or 
increase its likelihood. A weak state enhances vulnerability and means sub-state 
violence can spread yet may not itself cause such violence. The trigger(s), 
precipitating factor or proximate “cause” could be some singular event; the conditions 
that sustain conflict systemic are more enduring. While resentment about an elite’s 
misuse of power may provoke dissatisfaction, poor people may channel anger into 
violent protest only in the absence of alternatives, or due to prolonged failure to 
secure redress of grievance. In such situations a sudden large increase in the price of 
the nation’s staple foodstuff could prove catalytic. Yet the very circumstances that 
merely predispose to violent conflict in one society could serve as a catalyst in 
another.  
 
Theoretical Explanations 
The diverse literature on civil conflict offers several different theories. Considerable 
effort has been devoted to cross-national data analysis directed at confirming or 
refuting one or other, linking conflict to specific sets of circumstances such as 
poverty, inequality, environmental scarcity, cultural diversity, institutional 
weaknesses, and regional contagion. But we should be wary of investing too much 
significance in just statistical relationships. High correlations are not tantamount to 
cause and effect, and will need further explanation themselves. Such analyses 
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inevitably pay less consideration to the particularities of each case. These are more 
likely to be revealed by adopting an historical approach – the approach preferred here. 
This section briefly identifies the main theoretical approaches. 
 
There are different ways of grouping the theories for purposes of convenience, such as 
political explanations, economic explanations, and cultural explanations: each 
category contains different versions. Structural and (neo-)institutional explanations 
can be compared with those that place most emphasis on the behaviour of individual 
actors, bad leaders for example. Accounts could also be distinguished into 
endogenous (domestic) “causes” and exogenous (regional, or wider international) 
“causes”. Collier (2000) and Collier and Hoeffler (2001) contrast theories that stress 
motivation with explanations that focus on opportunity. Some accounts defy easy 
categorisation, or the terms of the categorisation are disputable. For instance, as wars 
over power relationships involving the state “ethnic wars” might seem primarily 
political and, possibly, cultural, but the roots could lie in the groups’ divergent 
experiences of socio-economic modernisation and material well-being. And while 
references to “greed” or to economic inequality both relate to economic 
considerations, it seems only the former is awarded the status of economic driver in 
Collier’s writings, which consign the latter to just one of many political “narratives of 
grievance”.  
 
Of course not all the arguments are mutually exclusive, and so no taxonomy is wholly 
unproblematic. Before turning to Zambia, then, briefly the following comprise most 
of the leading contenders.  
 
First, there is the proposition that violence is fuelled by ethnic, racial and religious 
hatreds (Kaplan 2000). Second, there is the theory that a generally poor fit between 
society and state increases the likelihood of civil, highlighting political exclusion as 
an especially potent factor (Holsti 1998). State legitimacy is conducive to state 
capacity; weak state legitimacy encourages political contestation to take the form of 
challenges to the state (Englebert 2000). Third, political repression and persecution by 
the state apart from being violent themselves (for instance “politicide” – attempts at 
the systematic elimination of political enemies) can provoke a violent response. 
Fourth, there is the argument from Collier that opportunity (to build rebel 
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organisations) is the most promising predictor of rebel conflict. There is a “resource 
curse”. As a proxy for economic greed here Collier uses significant income from 
heavy dependence on mineral enclaves, or primary commodity exports more broadly.  
 
Fifth, there are a cluster of propositions incorporating economic or socio-economic 
circumstances that vary from “environmental scarcity”, through economic decline 
(gradual and slow or alternatively an abrupt shock) to the persistence of low incomes, 
poverty and, perhaps most distinctive, great socio-economic inequality. Although 
different in important ways from one another, all these in their own way have been 
claimed to favour political instability and possibly lead to violent conflict. To cite one 
example, Collier et al. (2003: 53) say the “key root cause of conflict is the failure of 
economic development”.5 If it is inequality that most increases vulnerability to violent 
conflict, then it may not be so crucial whether the most relevant inequalities are 
vertical (elite-mass) or horizontal between groups. Either one may be capable of 
generating serious discontent, but they become most dangerous when the two sets of 
cleavage coincide. Aside from distributive considerations, grievance can arise from 
the disappointment of material expectations or from dashed aspirations even when the 
economic performance has not been disastrous.  
 
Sixth, there is the argument that unstable neighbours and insecure borders increase the 
hazard of importing conflict involuntarily - civil war is a regional “public bad” 
(Sambanis 2001). An additional threat exists if a country is deliberately targeted by its 
neighbours in response to their own sense of insecurity.  Finally, there is evidence that 
societies with a history of civil war or wars of liberation are statistically more likely to 
descend into conflict again. Only in part may this owe to the damage conflict causes 
to the economy and state; for “conflict actors” may acquire a vested interest in 
perpetuating conflict, leading to a vicious circle of civil war.6  
 
All in all, the theories are so different as to make it improbable that any one country 
will meet all the various conditions spelled out in the explanations. Indeed, a detailed 
exploration of Zambia’s experience is worthwhile if only in order to confirm that 
violent conflict has perhaps been “over-determined”. But at the same time we should 
not ignore that countries are dynamic even in the presence of continuities from one 
generation to another. The valuable idea of “path dependence” maintains that legacies 
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or inheritances from the past can significantly shape the present and future prospects 
(with or without a lag). But that does not exclude the possibility of there being 
temporal differences. Thus Zambia’s three republican eras do not constitute a static 
experience. It is quite feasible that while one set of reasons explains the absence of 
conflict in one particular period a different set of reasons might work best for another 
period when the country faced a different mix of vulnerabilities to conflict.  In other 
words, the business of explaining is situational. Indeed it will be argued below that an 
explanation that is both multilayered and dynamic, that is to say changing 
combinations of reasons, helps make sense of Zambia’s experience, even though over 
time certain common or core factors do stand out more than others.  
 
Zambia into the First Republic  
 
Legacies from the Past 
Unlike many countries in the region Zambia attained independence without extensive 
or protracted violent struggle. Some of the white residents openly supported black 
aspirations. Peaceful political competition between parties became established well in 
advance and eventually included electoral competition between black Africans 
ultimately pursuing the same nationalist end. Although Kenneth Kaunda’s UNIP 
came to dominate the political landscape after the founding members broke away 
from Harry Nkumbula’s African National Congress (ANC), ANC retained a 
significant presence after independence by virtue of its power base in Southern 
Province and a minority of seats in the National Assembly. It provided a focus for 
political opposition. A scenario whereby the ANC could pose a strong challenge for 
power forming electoral alliances with break-away groups from UNIP became 
increasingly plausible in the First Republic. 
 
The absence of violent confrontation among UNIP and ANC during the struggle for 
independence owed in no small measure to their shared opposition to the 
incorporation of Northern Rhodesia into the Central African Federation (1953-63). 
The Federation was resented by all: it meant domination by the racist administration 
in Southern Rhodesia. It was disagreements over how to lever disengagement from 
the Federation and gain self-rule that separated the parties - differences not of 
ideology or of affiliation to some external superpower, but over tactics and the 
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respective party leaders’ competence to lead. Furthermore, Kaunda’s leadership of the 
independence struggle committed his followers to ‘non violent positive action’ (which 
was written into UNIP’s constitution). ‘Through tremendous efforts but rather 
successfully’ Kaunda deterred supporters from using violent methods; and with that 
‘major trauma of the Zambian nationalist dream’ (Binsbergen 1976:103) as a warning, 
Kaunda used the Lenshina uprising at public rallies to urge general avoidance of  
sectarianism and other threats to unity and stability. Nothing like the Lumpa 
movement, which was backed by some settlers opposed to independence and had 
seemed bent on creating a state within a state, reoccurred after the church was 
officially banned in 1964. In this the cultivation of a productive symbiosis between 
the new state of Zambia and the established Christian churches served to enhance the 
state’s legitimacy, but social trends were helpful too (Binsbergen 1976: 130). The 
rural peasantry who had joined the Lumpa movement were increasingly brought into 
contact with the modernising influences of urbanisation and UNIP’s nation-building 
straytegies, which made movement unlikely to persist especially after the death of its 
founder, ‘holy woman’ Alice Lenshina. 
 
However, although a unique phenomenon the movement and more specifically the 
violence immediately before independence had a lasting significance in its 
reinforcement of Kaunda’s commitment to non-violence, rooted in his own lifelong 
Christian beliefs. Later on, in Kaunda on Violence (1980) he reflected on how ‘much 
harder than winning debates at conferences was the business of schooling our 
ordinary members in the rules of non-violence’ (1980: 55). For although once in 
power Kaunda modified his pacifism and went on to defend the armed struggle for 
black liberation in Rhodesia, his abiding conviction of the wisdom of preventing non-
violent protest turn violent, by making concessions, was to serve Zambia well – at the 
closure of the Second Republic.  
 
Social Composition and State-Society Fit 
Zambia is a country of 73 officially recognised ethnic groups and 17 different 
languages, of which seven (plus English) have the status of national language. 
Although in pre-colonial times there was considerably greater parity among the 
different ethno-linguistic groups, by 1990 around 40 per cent of the population had 
come to use Bemba as first or second language, 30 per cent employed Nyanja, 12 per 
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cent Tonga and 10 per cent Lozi (Posner 2003: 129). At no point has one group held 
an absolute majority. This demographic profile probably means Zambia never was a 
strong candidate for extensive inter-communal violence. There are several points 
worth making here.  
 
First, the presence of ethno-linguistic diversity does not itself mean that a new post-
colonial state will be badly aligned with previously existing political systems – 
something that could be a far more significant determinant of stability. Applying the 
concept of horizontal legitimacy, that is to say consensus about the definition of the 
community over which rule is exercised, Englebert (2000) calculated that Zambia 
occupies a position around mid-way, on a scale between 0 (where a post-colonial state 
is highly incongruent from a territorial point of view) and a maximum of 1 (high 
ethnic identification). He calculated that at least 15 African states were less 
favourably situated than Zambia. Other states were more favourably situated. 
However the degree to which this alone explains Zambia’s peace is questionable, for 
although more arbitrary states like DRC and Somalia have known much violence so 
have Uganda, Mozambique and Rwanda whose horizontal legitimacy exceeds that of 
Zambia. Nigeria with a score closest to Zambia has experienced civil war, military 
coups and significant recent violence between religious communities. Moreover 
ethnic plurality does not necessarily mean society will be deeply or sharply divided, 
especially if there are several ethnic “markers” (language, race, territory) competing 
among themselves. Indeed there is aggregate data to show that that ethnic diversity 
does not even have significant consequences for a society’s ability to sustain 
democracy (Fish and Brooks 2004). And recent research suggests that religious 
divisions are more important than language divisions in explaining ethnic conflicts 
(Reynal-Querol 2002). Zambia has an overwhelmingly Christian background, even 
though not one but several Christian churches have a vibrant presence in the country 
today.   
 
Second, if we accept – as most analysts argue – that ethnic identity is as much (or 
more) socially constructed and malleable than it is some primordial thing, then both 
the likelihood of it being a significant factor in politics and its political effects depend 
on political agency. The key question becomes do the politicians instrumentalise 
identity as a central part of their mobilisation strategies, and do they couch overt 
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appeals in exclusionary terms? From the start President Kaunda set out to build “one 
Zambia, one nation”: this created a very notable legacy. The country’s Asian and 
white residents were not victimised. Kaunda was alert to the dangers that ethnic 
cleavages can give rise to and was keen to discourage rival politicians from making 
divisive ethnic appeals. Following Molteno’s (1974: 100) analysis, compared to 
ethno-politics pure and simple, sectionalism arising from provincial competition for 
resources provides a more accurate lens through which to view the political 
contestation in the first Republic. ‘Sectionalism’ arises in the first place and primarily 
from competition for power among leaders; sectional interests are essentially interest 
groups competing for resources. It should not be misread as deep-seated ‘tribal’ 
divisions let alone portrayed as the stirrings of tribal hatred – something that Zambia 
has always been spared. 
 
Third, despite “a multitude of explanations, which are segmented along the 
primordialist-instrumentalist fault-line, there are few solidly specified models 
suggesting clearly how ethnic enmity is the real cause of violence and not, as is very 
often the case, its by-product” (de Soysa 2002: 402; see also Fearon and Laitin 1996, 
and Collier, Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). Ethnic heterogenity as such does not 
cause violent conflict. There is more evidence to suggest that civil war is most likely 
where there are two sharply polarized and internally cohesive groups, with the 
politically dominant group refusing to share power, than in more highly fractionalised 
societies like Zambia.7 And UNIP from the liberation struggle onwards tried hard to 
be a national organisation that drew members at all levels from every part of Zambia, 
even though in Southern Province it could not entirely displace the ANC. Both UNIP 
before the 1990s and then Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) in the 1990s 
were successful in polling support in every province and from across the entire ethnic 
spectrum. In a multi-ethnic country like Zambia this approach to coalition-building 
among ethno-regional groups is entirely rational for political parties that want to share 
in power at the centre. Those politicians who seek to capitalise on a purely local 
political base by standing in opposition to the party leadership before an election do 
so not in order to divide communities but for the bargaining power it will bring when 
they offer to go over to the dominant side. 
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In fact Scarritt and Mozaffar show in Zambia that apart from a few instances where 
small new (and ultimately unsuccessful) parties presented a more narrowly-based 
ethnic identity, pluralistic multi-ethnic or non-ethnic parties are the dominant 
organisational form.8 Of course their finding is contingent on how they define ethnic 
or potential ethnic party - one drawing over 75 per cent of its support from a single 
group - and historically speaking many non-Bembas especially have tended to view 
political life at the centre in part through an ethnic lens. The attention paid to the 
ethnic and regional composition of cabinet appointments is an example. Nevertheless 
party competition in Zambia has not been just a simile for ethnic contest, in either the 
First or the Third Republic. Horowitz (1993: 28) said the “extent to which military 
rule in Africa is a function of the ethnic failures of electoral politics can hardly be 
overestimated”. In Zambia neither the ethnic impact nor the ethnic consequences of 
its electoral politics have been so dire as to produce, let alone justify, military rule. 
 
Economic Performance 
Zambia has not fallen prey to the ‘resource curse’ notwithstanding the fact that 
mining most notably for copper has regularly provided over three quarters of its 
essential foreign currency earnings. (In recent years minings’s contribution to 
government revenue has gone into steep decline, with the state-owned industry 
becoming a net drain on the public finances by the late 1990s). Zambia’s experience 
is not unique of course, for unlike say Sierra Leone Botswana too has managed to 
combine high-value non-renewable riches (diamonds) with enduring civil peace. The 
use to which natural resource wealth is put offers an explanation.  
 
Zambia in its first decade of independence enjoyed impressive social and economic 
progress. Public spending averaged around twenty per cent annual increase between 
1965 and 1970  (at 1970 prices), funding general educational and health care 
improvements and creating new employment opportunities. Over half of all new 
recorded wage employment occurred in the public sector. There were very large real 
wage rises. The extended family meant a portion of the benefits gained in the 
expanding formal sector of a growing urban economy were passed on to the rural 
areas. The Copperbelt – the main productive source of the income – is not on the 
periphery of Zambian territory: secessionist dreams of the kind found in some other 
parts of post-colonial Africa (Cabinda in Angola and Biafra in Nigeria, for example) 
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would never have been practical. The very physical nature of copper mining’s product 
and the extensive employment-intensive infrastructure that it sustained means the 
industry is not vulnerable to seizure by bandits, unlike Sierra Leone’s so-called 
“conflict diamonds”. In sum, neither greed and resource-based opportunism nor 
widespread popular grievance – two opposing theorisations of the violent conflict 
found elsewhere in Africa- are applicable to Zambia at this time. Also, there was (and 
still is) no serious land hunger. Zambia, an under-populated country of around 10 
million people does not know “environmental scarcity” in that sense, although fuel 
and seasonal water shortages are a regular feature in some areas. 
 
To summarise, the circumstances of Zambia’s struggle for independence and 
immediate aftermath differed greatly from those in some other countries including 
Zimbabwe and Angola where the nationalist struggles were violent and divisive for 
the black majority. Zambia’s First Republic was a period of social and economic 
progress and considerable optimism. Zambia appeared to enjoy benign leadership 
committed to non-violent political competition carried out within a plural political 
framework bequeathed by a negotiated transition to independence. The political 
institutionalisation made possible by Kaunda’s commitment to UNIP as a strong 
national party kept pace with, or even ran ahead, of the increase in political 
participation. This meant the dominant party could structure and manage the demands 
arising out of social mobilisation and modernisation, so giving Zambia a firm 
platform to avoid the kind of turmoil that Huntington (1968) believed was fostered 
whenever political institutionalisation lagged behind social modernisation. The 
political leadership made extensive symbolic and material investment in political 
strategies of nation building, which ranged from resourcing such institutions 
alongside UNIP as a youth movement and a women’s movement to the design of the 
school curricula and managing harmonious relations with traditional chiefs and 
religious leaders.  The country was never an obvious candidate for extensive inter-
communal violence grounded on ethnic or religious differences. 
 
Regional Context 
Although in Kaunda’s words  (1980: 158) Zambia was ‘truly a war baby, born to the 
sound of gunfire on her northern, western and eastern frontiers’, it was to the south 
that it found itself in the position of ‘front-line state’ - against white-ruled Southern 
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Rhodesia and apartheid South Africa. However, rather than conspiring to cause 
internal problems inside Zambia this external situation proved on balance to be an 
integrating force. Certainly there was some South African complicity in the Mushala 
uprising; and in 1978 the Rhodesia airforce bombed refugee camps in Zambia. And 
Zambia’s economy suffered greatly following white minority-ruled Southern 
Rhodesia’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, which precipitated 
United Nations’ backed sanctions right up to Zimbabwean independence in 1980. 
Vital rail and road connections pass through Zimbabwe from Zambia to the sea. Also 
for many years after, Zambia has been host to refugees fleeing zones of conflict 
across its borders, the numbers reaching as many as 200,000 in the 1990s due to 
fighting in neighbouring Angola and DRC. The existence of ethnic ties cutting across 
borders meant Zambia could have become embroiled in its neighbour’s affairs. 
 
Yet throughout its history, a conviction that the country is too weak militarily to risk 
external war together with skilful management of foreign affairs and diplomatic 
relations even with apartheid South Africa, have insulated Zambia from destructive 
involvement in the bitter divisions nearby. Indeed, far from social divisions in Zambia 
being accentuated by the insecurities of the wider region, the country’s own “front 
line” situation probably strengthened Kaunda’s authority at home and serve to unify 
the country. The new state was able to make demands of its people on grounds of 
national security that in other countries or in different times might have led to a more 
determined, even violent response. Later, in the Third Republic President Chiluba 
showed similar determination that Zambia’s political opening to multiparty 
competition in 1991 should not give former ‘comrades’ in neighbouring states who 
might feel threatened a pretext for meddling in Zambia’s internal affairs. He did this 
by seeking to persuade fellow Africans that it was the responsibility of the 
Organisation of African Unity to encourage the democratisation of states elsewhere in 
the region (Chiluba 1995: 115). Subsequently he drew plaudits in Europe for trying 
(without much success) to mediate the military conflict involving forces from several 
countries including Uganda and Zimbabwe in the DRC. 
 
The First Republic was brought to an end following growing concern by Kaunda that 
political competition could aggravate ethnic divisions in the country. The introduction 
of the Second Republic abolished plural politics in the name of harmony. The ANC 
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used the courts to register its objection, before conceding politically. Kaunda’s critics 
maintain he was motivated more by a desire to retain power in the face of signs that 
UNIP could be about to lose its dominance. Arguably the breakdown of the First 
Republic in 1970-72 was a time when repression - or suppressed ethnopolitical and 
sectional conflict - was at its height. We cannot know the probable course of events if 
the Second Republic had not been established at this point. But the fact that the 
increase of political violence that Kaunda claimed would happen otherwise did not in 
fact materialise perhaps suggests that the initiative was timely; in contrast to some 
African states it was not the product of a despotic leadership bent on exploiting the 
country for personal gain. Even so, in time the Second Republic itself increasingly 
came to look vulnerable to a different set of forces likely to promote disorder and, 
possibly, violent conflict. 
 
The Second Republic 
The idea of having one, uncontested leader as a stabilising force may help explain the 
relative peace of Zambia’s one-party state. A comparable situation existed in 
Tanzania; President Nyerere and Kaunda drew mutual reinforcement for the 
legitimacy of their role. Yet there were moments when, if not the stability of the 
leadership then public support for the direction it gave appeared to come into 
question. Apart from the coup plots already mentioned, there were political strikes by 
key workers on the Copperbelt protesting against the 1980 Local Administration Act 
that threatened local government autonomy. More general unrest – fuelled by 
economic circumstances  - mounted as the years wore on. But general elections were 
held at regular intervals, and many voters appeared not to see them as a meaningless 
charade but instead seized the opportunity to remove leading politicians. The 
opportunity to participate in this way, and vent political grievance by exercising 
choice, provided a valuable element of continuity in political practice notwithstanding 
the obvious constraints of a one-party state.  
 
At the same time the Second Republic can be characterised as “soft repression”. 
Power was centralised – the opposite of the warlordism that tore Somalia apart. 
Formally a state of emergency existed from colonial times up to the very end of the 
Second Republic. (It was reintroduced, temporarily, in 1993, following an alleged plot 
by a few disgrunted opposition figures to foment civil disobedience, and again in 
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1997 after an attempted coup by a handful of junior officers). Occasionally critics of 
the regime would be held in detention and, on their release co-opted in public service; 
for others, the risk of being denied opportunities for personal economic advancement 
was enough to guarantee their political passivity, avoiding resort to more heavy-
handed threats or punishments. Techniques like having not one but several 
intelligence and military organisations part of whose purpose was to maintain 
surveillance of one another, helped secure civilian rule. In any case military men were 
appointed to senior positions in government and the army was relatively well 
provided for in a country without major external threats or international commitments. 
No less important the government continued for as long as possible its welfarist 
policies, which underpinned social order even though they ultimately proved 
financially and economically ruinous. For much of the period the absence of 
irresistible pressure from the international financial institutions to rigorously pursue 
orthodox fiscal and monetary policies was very accommodating too: by not forcing 
more austere measures on the government tit perhaps made its own small contribution 
to preserving the peace. 
 
The important point here is that Zambia is one of those countries where the informal 
institutions of neo-patrimonialism and clientelism provide a kind of glue that helps 
ensure cohesion between ethno-regional elites, and maintains links between political 
elites and ordinary people. These institutions are “the cement by which ethnic 
identities are amalgamated within the boundaries of a more inclusive political system” 
(Lemarchand 1972: 70; see also Rothchild and Foley 1988, and Chabal and Daloz 
1999). A necessary condition for this to work effectively is that the arrangements are 
sufficiently inclusive to prevent the emergence of “ethnoclass conflict” – that is where 
ethnic stratification and class divisions coincide. Another necessary condition is that 
there is enough patronage to go round.  
 
In Zambia that condition seemed to be met to one degree or another for a large part of 
the 1970s and 1980s. Kaunda, a master of the ethnic and provincial arithmetic when 
making appointments, endeavoured to maintain loyalties across the political spectrum 
both through formal policies that dispensed public goods like spending on education 
and informal neo-patrimonial interventions, all managed within the inclusionary 
structures of the single party. Eventually the government’s ability to finance all this 
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became increasingly strained, not only because it was synonymous with economic 
mismanagement but because of adverse movements in the world copper price after 
1975. Nevertheless for many years the urban population continued to experience the 
benefits of subsidised maize (the nation’s staple), peasant farmers however remote 
from the line of rail enjoyed guaranteed sales, and industrial workers were kept 
largely quiescent through industrial protectionist policies and concessions to their 
wage demands. This political economy approach to maintaining political stability 
proved largely effective until the mid-1980s. And although socio-economic 
inequalities (especially urban-rural) existed, policy towards managing the country’s 
social and economic affairs was not ethnicised in ways that were highly 
discriminatory.  
 
In the second half of the 1980s, however, cumulative economic discontents grew 
more serious, and by 1990 the growing signs of active protest were unmistakable. 
Kaunda’s agreement eventually, albeit reluctantly, to allow the return of political 
pluralism meant that Zambia enjoyed a peaceful transition back to multiparty politics. 
In April 1990 Kaunda agreed to hold a referendum on return to multi-partyism. 
Following large pro-democracy rallies staged by the MMD in September, Kaunda 
decided to abandon the referendum and recommend changing the constitution. These 
developments are strongly evocative of Kaunda’s reflection some years before (1980: 
54) that ‘any ruling power which is wise enough to make sufficient concessions to 
vindicate non-violent opposition, would probably be wise enough in the first place to 
read the signs of the times and change things’. The political concessions were 
certainly prudent, although it seems Kaunda did not anticipate losing the presidency. 
 
Not just the way the process of political change was managed but its direction 
conformed to the widely-held view that the more closely a polity resembles stable 
liberal democracy the less likely there will be domestic collective violence. For 
example according to Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000: 246) “the best - and  - fastest 
strategy to reduce the incidence of civil war in Africa is to institute democratic 
reforms that effectively manage the socio-cultural diversity of African societies”. And 
for Sandbrook (2002: 151) although “democracy is not a panacea for deadly conflict, 
particular circumstances make it a gamble worth taking”, because for instance 
democratic countries do not fall foul of complex humanitarian emergencies.9 The 
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probability theory of a democratic civil peace presents a counterpart to the well-
known proposition in international relations theory that democracies do not go to war 
with one another (“democratic peace thesis”). The reasoning in the two cases is 
similar: in theory democracies encourage negotiation and compromise, bargaining and 
exchange, even if the reality (both in inter-state relations and in the internal politics of 
a contemporary democracy like Zambia) does not always exemplify these traits in 
full. A further theory claims democracies are less prone to internal conflict because 
they are usually more stable than non-democracies (in high-income societies, 
anyway). Yet more complex reasoning suggests that in the long run democracies 
provide a more reliable political environment for economic development which in 
turn offers the best surety for peace. Arguably none of these grounds for choosing 
democracy were what impressed Kaunda at the time so much as a conviction that the 
stability Zambia had enjoyed to date could be put at risk by resisting the escalating 
demands for political reform. His senior military advisers probably advised as much. 
Also, since the fall of the Berlin wall major international donors were signalling their 
desire to see democratic political reform in many countries previously considered 
immune from external pressure. 
 
So in Zambia political transition was carried out consensually, amid negotiations 
between Kaunda and MMD over the details of constitutional change and with 
respected church representatives mediating the disputes. At that time MMD too could 
be said to offer a unifying force, as all varieties of opposition to the status quo 
coalesced behind its leadership, so making a smooth political transition possible and a 
change of government in the ensuing elections that much more likely. Yet it is worth 
noting here that as a general rule democratisation offers no easy solution. For 
although established democracies with strong institutions, stable and inclusionary 
instruments of governance, and the rule of law neither invite nor provoke domestic 
conflict and they normally resolve conflict peacefully, in contrast polities in transition 
appear to be uniquely vulnerable, for two reasons. First, although conflict-suppression 
and an absence of conflict do not amount to the same thing, there is evidence to 
suggest that strong autocracies share with established democracies a low probability 
of civil war. In contrast, weak autocracies and intermediate regimes or semi-
democracies are more vulnerable in this regard. This is because although political and 
civil liberties are not yet sufficient for people to feel they can express their grievances 
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and gain satisfaction through the established political channels alone, they are not 
cowed into submission: the cost of collective action is not prohibitive (Muller 1985: 
48). Thus the relationship between regime types and violent conflict is said to 
resemble an inverted u-curve (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch 2001). Second, 
the very process of political change – even “progressive” change intended to liberalise 
formerly authoritarian regimes - may be no less hazardous because of the 
uncertainties it can create. Democratic reform is “a risky strategy as it unleashes 
tensions that may aggravate the underlying crises”(Sandbrook 2002: 171; see also 
Hegre et al. 2001). In Zambia the peaceful nature of the political transition and 
subsequent change of government suggest that a shared commitment to managing 
difference and resolving conflict by non-violent means was already an embedded 
feature of the political culture.  But that does not mean the peace is guaranteed 
indefinitely, especially if a new democracy fails to follow an appropriate institutional 
design (such as more rather than less inclusionary forms) and/or fails to meet the basic 
material needs of its people. The establishment of the Third Republic, then, introduces 
the possibility of yet new challenges to peace  
  
The Third Republic 
Since 1991 Zambia’s ability to sustain something like a democratic civil peace might 
seem just as remarkable as its earlier capacity for avoiding violence in a much 
troubled region. For one thing political order started to disintegrate in DRC and in 
Zimbabwe; further afield, in Côte d’Ivoire in 1999 democratic progress was reversed 
by a military coup, and even now the country has not regained its former peace. For 
another thing, Zambia is almost unique among developing countries that have not 
experienced severe conflict in the scale of its continuing economic decline and 
increase of poverty during the last two decades. Whereas for instance peaceful 
Botswana enjoyed average annual increase in per capita Gross National Product of 
over 7 per cent after 1965 and, from 1980 annual increases in private consumption per 
capita of 3 per cent, Zambia’s record has been minus 2 per cent and minus 3.6 per 
cent respectively. Of the other relatively peaceful states in the region neither the 
economic performance of Tanzania or Malawi can compare with Zambia’s dramatic 
decline. The percentage of Zambians now said to live on less than a dollar a day (over 
70 per cent) and on less than two dollars a day (over 90 per cent) are very high even 
for southern Africa - the latter figure being half as high again as in Botswana and in 
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Tanzania.10 In Zambia average life expectancy has fallen far, from 50 years in 1980 to 
under 40 years now. Public welfare policies in the 1990s have been austere, 
constrained by the international financial institutions and the policy of cash budgeting 
introduced in 1993. Education and health have typically been allocated only around 2-
3 per cent of Gross National Product per annum for most of the 1990s. 
 
Furthermore, in Zambia inequality too is exceptionally high: with a Gini index figure 
of over 52, only around fifteen countries currently have higher recorded figures. The 
richest 10 per cent of the population enjoy 41 per cent of income or consumption 
(compared with 34 per cent in 1991). The lowest 20 per cent account for just 3.3 per 
cent of income or consumption (down from 5.6 per cent in 1991) and the lowest 10 
per cent for only 1.1 per cent of income or consumption.11 So, with fewer resources 
cascading down through patronage networks, visible signs of growing inequality and 
increasing poverty, and declining formal sector employment (to just a few hundred 
thousand, with youth unemployment in particular being high), certain conflict theories 
would predict growing unrest. How has Zambia managed so far to escape that and 
violent consequences? What makes this question even more pertinent is that the 
country’s democratic reforms also faltered in the course of the 1990s, such that by 
mid-decade commentators were speculating that a return to semi-authoritarian rule 
was imminent (for example Joseph 1998: 6). Notable symptoms were the one-party 
dominance exercised by MMD, concentration of power in the presidency and some 
intolerance of critical dissent.  Aggregate data analysis finds a “high level of 
inequality and a regime structure that is neither democratic nor totalitarian appear to 
be the two potent ingredients of a recipe for political instability” (Muller 1985:60). 
 
A Sort of Democratic Domestic Peace 
Notwithstanding the existence of general theories that specify one or more of 
extensive poverty, inequality, and liberal democratic shortcomings as conditions 
favourable to violent conflict these are not sufficient conditions even when taken in 
combination. And when they do incline towards political instability, the result is not 
necessarily great violence. Much depends on local context and the presence or 
absence of other conflict-inducing factors. To understand Zambia’s recent experience, 
then, it is worth revisiting some familiar themes. 
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Take ethnopolitics. Zambia’s politicians continue to factor ethnic and provincial 
considerations into their strategies for mobilising support at local levels; and it is true 
that in the December 2001 elections the main parties polled most strongly in their 
leader’s home province. Yet the language of “tribalism” still features mostly as 
negative currency in national political debates - an accusatory tactic aimed at 
delegitimating opponents’ campaigns and putting them on the defensive. Naturally 
such accusations help politicians mobilise their own ethnically-based political support 
against rivals they portray as tribal, and doubtless that is precisely the intention. But a 
shared awareness of the nature of the game that is being played together with the 
condemnatory message contained within the rhetoric limits its ability to do serious 
damage to inter-communal relations, especially in a country where there has been 
much inter-marriage between groups and other ethnic mixing. “Tribal balancing”, in 
contrast, is perceived in a positive light, even though the logic of it actually requires 
ethnicity to be factored into political calculations. Thus because Chiluba was not as 
careful over the ethnic arithmetic as Kaunda when making cabinet appointments, 
traditional suspicions of favouritism towards Bembas came once more to the surface. 
The predominant contribution that Luapula and Northern Province voters made to the 
MMD’s ability to retain power in December 2001 now helps keep that alive. 
 
However, perceptions that ethnicity is divisive are blurred perhaps more than ever by 
the almost universal sharing in the misfortunes of economic decline, which has even 
brought a narrowing of the former urban-rural differential. Susceptibility to 
HIV/AIDS too is no respecter of ethnic identity: around 25 per cent of the population 
are reckoned to be at risk. Such shared experience can be integrative. There is a 
pervasive sense too of resignation about Zambia’s dependence on foreign donors, who 
by 2000 accounted for around a quarter of the Gross Domestic Product, were 
financing all of the government’s capital spending, and whose willingness to relieve 
foreign debt of over $7billion is deemed essential. It is easy for political debate in 
Zambia to hold the World Bank and International Monetary Fund responsible for the 
paucity of economic and social policy options, thereby channelling grievance away 
from the elected representatives even though their own commitment to promoting 
pro-poor solutions is questionable. So although economically-motivated crime 
including violent robbery is now prevalent, there has been no increase of political 
violence directed against the state. 
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 Indeed, the relevance of the state in its economic aspect is for many Zambians hard to 
detect. It hardly seems worth fighting over. Non-governmental organisations funded 
by the donors endeavour to substitute the provision of essential services like health 
and education in rural areas, and as with the adverse effects of cash budgeting and the 
overall financial constraints there is no obvious discrimination along ethnic lines. 
Ideological class-based opposition to the government among the political elite 
remains non-existent. And, given the decline of the mining industry - to the point 
where only large-scale investment by private international investors could possibly 
rescue it (even then the prospects are uncertain) - the economic opportunism captured 
by Collier’s “greed” theory of rebellion continues to lack any purchase in 
contemporary Zambia.  
 
This leaves the impact of the country’s political institutional arrangements to account 
for. Freedom House’s most recent rating of Zambia is 4 for political rights and civil 
liberties, on a descending scale of 1 to 7 (Karatnycky 2004: 91). That means Zambia 
is judged only ‘partly free’. The December 2001 elections were deemed unsatisfactory 
by several observer organisations including Zambia’s main civil society 
representatives, because of the appearance of irregularities whose significance was 
heightened by the closeness of the declared result (see Burnell 2002). However even 
the challenge this poses to peace should not be overestimated.  
 
First, there is Zambia’s unbroken tradition of holding general elections without resort 
to “electoral violence’’ aimed at prejudicing the outcome or overturning the declared 
result, dating back from before 1964. This is a consciously ‘lived’ tradition. In the 
Third Republic so far general elections have been held in 1991, 1996 and December 
2001 and local elections in 1992, 1998 and 2001. Parliamentary by-elections have 
been a regular occurrence. Mphaisha’s (2000: 145) judgment that “popular confidence 
in the multiparty system remained” even after the controversies surrounding the 1996 
elections (when UNIP declined to contest the presidency because changes to the 
constitution made Kaunda ineligible) was born out when in 2001. Turnout reached 
almost 70 per cent (of registered voters), who stripped the MMD of its majority in 
parliament. Historically Zambia has inclined towards a predominant party system 
(Burnell 2001) but the more competitive element that emerged in 2001 could yet be 
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here to stay. It is notable that although President Mwanawas has sought both to co-opt 
and divide political opponents, the parliamentary opposition remains robust and civil 
society is vigilant not least because of dissatisfaction over his reluctance to speed 
constitutional changes that might endanger his re-election in 2006. But in some 
respects Mwanawasa’s presidency compares favourably with the more autocratic 
reputation of his predecessor, which connects in part with the insecurity that comes 
from having gained only a very narrow victory supported by a minority of voters in an 
election whose result is still subject to legal challenge. No less important, the 
independent media is more professional and more firmly entrenched now than at any 
previous time in the country’s history. In seeking to resolve the many disputes with 
the executive and among themselves Zambia’s politicians continue the tradition of 
making resort to the courts in preference for more populist forms of direct action. 
Notwithstanding some doubts about the political autonomy of the judiciary, this 
suggests – and by constant reinforcement adds to – their commitment to the rule of 
law. 
 
The overall picture then is of a political system that is basically stable, with public 
demand being for more, not less, democracy. Evidence from Afrobarometer surveys 
of public opinion indicate that close to three quarters of Zambians prefer democracy 
to the alternatives, and only 10 per cent believe the current system has major 
problems (Bratton 2004b). In terms of the probability of democratic consolidation 
Bratton places Zambia second (after Botswana) among some twelve ‘Anglophone’ 
African states covered in his survey. Zambian levels of popular support for and the 
perceived extent of democracy are not very far apart, which in general terms bodes 
well for stability. But perhaps crucially the demand is greater than supply rather than 
the other way round, as most recently a growing number of Zambians do see major 
problems with the country’s Zambia’s democracy. Bratton attributes that to the 
widespread perception of electoral irregularities and failure to achieve an alternation 
in power in 2001 (Bratton 2004a). As such it could be temporary phenomenon, which 
will recede as political debate intensifies in anticipation of the 2006 elections and a 
further chance to change the government. More significant over the longer run could 
be Bratton’s larger finding that the demand for democracy appears to benefit from a 
post-colonial legacy of electoral competition even where, as in Zambia’s Second 
Republic, this occurred within a de jure one-party context (Bratton 2004b).  
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 Finally there is the international context. Whereas during the Cold War superpower 
intervention provoked conflict in Africa, using states as surrogates for imperial 
rivalries, since 1989 the established western liberal democracies have been virtually 
unopposed in demanding evidence of democratisation, human rights and “good 
governance”. Although seemingly powerless to prevent conflict breaking out in places 
like Liberia, the donors retain a significant capacity to influence the prospects for 
peace in Zambia. There, political stability and espousal of democracy are well 
understood to be requisites not just for the donors’ financial lifeline but if the country 
is to attract the private international capital investment that the economy so 
desperately needs. In so far as continued foreign assistance helps fund the politics of 
patronage, which in turn facilitates some links between ruling elites and ordinary 
people, there are powerful incentives to continue to co-operate with the international 
institutions and their political demands.  
 
Indeed, it was international pressure along with the strong opposition of Zambian civil 
society, which joined forces with leading members of the political opposition, that 
came before Chiluba’s decision in mid-2001 to abandon plans to change the 
constitution in support of a third term. For a short time in 2001 it looked as though the 
third term bid might be a catalyst for violent protest and a physical response by 
Chiluba’s supporters and the authorities. But Chiluba like Kaunda before him proved 
to be no example of that category of political leaders that David (1997: 565) says are 
sufficiently evil to provoke large-scale bloodshed if judged conducive to their 
retaining power. Although Chiluba currently faces prosecution on corruption-related 
charges, even under his presidency the ‘criminalisation of politics’ did not embrace 
the violent methods seen in some other parts of Africa, where Allen (1999) connected 
it to increasing political violence and impending state implosion as spoils politics 
entered its terminal phase. On the contrary, Mwanawasa has achieved some 
popularity by targeting corruption and promising that the culprits will brought to 
account.  
 
Future Outlook 
While Mozambique is now enjoying  ‘a peace dividend’ and some other countries 
show signs of settling down following war’s end in Angola and military 
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disengagement from the DRC, perhaps ironically Zambia’s continuing free from 
violent conflict should not be considered inevitable. In Africa generally rcent years 
have seen a creeping “crisis of patrimonialism” (Allen 1999).  If material resources 
shrink to the point that “codes of reciprocity” within the neo-patrimonial system can 
no longer be preserved and “big men” cheat remorselessly on their followers, then 
writers like Azam (2001) and Le Billon (2003) expect the “glue” connecting elites 
and their clients to weaken. As Lichbach (1989: 461), Cramer (2003) and others have 
argued, it is not inequality as such but how inequality is sustained - the view people 
have towards it and the structures permitting it - that shape violent conflict. Even now 
the popular view in Zambia is that most government officials and politicians are 
mainly concerned with enriching themselves.12  Negative perceptions of the vertical 
divisions in Zambian society could yet sharpen even as the political economy 
responsible for the country’s poverty minimises the salience of horizontal differences 
between ethnic groups.  
 
Conflict theories that cite economic decline, or stagnant low average incomes, or the 
social frustrations produced by relative deprivation and growing resentment at the 
predatory behaviour of a privileged few all might seem to suggest that time could be 
running out. Zambia’s profile today fits the high-risk category of countries facing a 
“Russian roulette of conflict risk. Even countries that have had long periods of peace 
do not seem to be safe” (Colliet et al. 2003: xvi)13 from descent into a self-
perpetuating and vicious circle of failed development, instability, violent conflict and 
yet more development failure. The present modest quality of Zambia’s democracy 
does not help either. And there is a consensus in the democratisation literature that the 
biggest single threat to democratic consolidation is failure to improve very poor socio-
economic conditions together with the persistence or increase of great inequalities. 
However none of this necessarily points to the probability of significant political 
violence any more than it means high levels of economic development are essential 
for stable democracy. Moreover the Third Republic has demonstrated already a 
capacity to weather incidents of the kind that sometimes precipitate crises elsewhere, 
for example large increases in the price of basic necessities and deep cuts in the armed 
forces’ budget (in Zambia to under 2 per cent of Gross Domestic Product). 
Nevertheless, so long as socio-economic conditions remain very challenging efforts to 
strengthen liberal democracy could well offer a sounder political strategy for peace 
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than would some alternative of putting democratisation into reverse. Zambians have 
only to look across the border to Zimbabwe to note the unhappy consequences that 
can follow from allowing democratic credentials to decay. External comparisons like 
that, while regrettable for the people of Zimbabwe make Zambians more likely to 
cherish and preserve their own lengthy more conflict-free tradition.  
 
Conclusion 
Asking why Zambia has not experienced more violent conflict than has been the case 
actually poses several different questions for different times in the country’s history. 
This is because the predisposing conditions and the potential conflict agents that 
might lead us to expect to see more political violence have varied over time. Thus a 
dynamic explanation is required. Similarly, just as a comprehensive explanation of 
violent conflict at any one point in time may refer to multiple causality, so the same is 
true of the absence of such conflict. However, while the theoretical literature on 
conflict is so rich that there is a temptation to make accounts appear over-determined, 
so the mirror image – over-determination of conflict’s absence in a country like 
Zambia – should be avoided too. In turn that means there is a fine path to steer 
between harbouring complacent predictions about Zambia’s future and the more 
pessimistic outlook that a continuation of its depressed socio-economic condition and 
liberal democratic shortcomings might seem to warrant. More profitable than 
speculating about the future, then, is a conclusion that summarises and distils 
Zambia’s past. No single explanation of Zambia’s record will suffice – something that 
in itself might be thought to justify a reasonable degree of optimism for the years 
ahead - but some components are more notable than others. 
  
In the First Republic by and large Zambians had a positive experience of economic 
and social progress, in a hostile regional environment that focused minds on the need 
to build national unity. Zambians could be proud of its political leadership at that 
time, not least because independence had been gained by peaceful political means: 
this combined with a promising economic outlook was unusual though not unique in 
southern Africa. Subsequently Kaunda’s alarm over growing group tensions 
orchestrated by rivals competing for power led to the prohibition of multiparty 
competition and an increasing concentration of political power. We cannot know if 
Zambia would have slid towards civil war without this stratagem, but the signs of 
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tension did then reduce – before they had developed to anything like the proportions 
that in some Africa countries brought the military into power. 
 
The Second Republic effectively contained conflict by regulating political 
competition within the arena of the single party, while continuing to encourage 
universal participation in a strong drive to build “one Zambia, one nation”. That 
commitment was a positive initiative for peace, although the Zambian state also 
appears to have had a better chance of building horizontal legitimacy than some other 
African states owing to the territorial relationship with its pre-colonial ethnic 
landscape. Moreover during the Second Republic the state insulated the people’s 
welfare for as long as possible from the full effects of the country’s deteriorating 
financial and economic situation. Here, the informal arrangements of patronage and 
clientelism (partly funded by donors) have been an integrative force, up to the present 
day. 
 
Even so, in the 1980s society’s growing impatience with development failings began 
to threaten stability. Against that background the importance of Zambia’s peaceful 
democratic transition in 1991 should not be underestimated, although again it would 
be unwise to assert that in its absence Zambia was destined for bloody revolution. 
That said, the introduction of the Third Republic did dissipate the agitation. 1993 saw 
only a minor aberration in the form of an alleged plot to provoke civil disobedience 
(the ‘zero option plan’) by a handful of UNIP activists, which manifestly lacked 
popular support. In the 1990s the modest record of democratic politics monitored by 
foreign donors who loaded the incentive structure against violent political initiatives, 
has helped engender a kind of democratic domestic peace. Admittedly the euphoria 
provided by the return of political pluralism was quick to wane. And although it was 
economic dissatisfaction that brought down the Second Republic, it could be argued 
that negligence over political shortcomings in Zambia’s new democracy should be a 
major cause for concern now. But the evidence is that most Zambians today want to 
see further improvements in the legitimacy and accountability of their rulers and have 
no nostalgia for more authoritarian formula of the kind that for a time seemed 
adequate in the past. Democratic consolidation could put behind the insecurities that 
are often  associated with weak states in political transition. In contrast, fixing the 
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economy can only be a long-term project, and is not within Zambia’s capacity to 
control. 
 
However, it cannot be denied that the Third Republican era has seen an increase of 
poverty, inequality, and (most notably during Chiluba’s second term) high-level 
corruption. And ultimately, long-established observers of African politics like 
Rotberg (2002) reckon that failure to deliver such positive political goods as 
education and health is a sure sign of impending state failure. Such failure in itself is 
said to be an almost certain recipe for violence, which in worst case scenarios 
cascades into all-out internal war. In the terminology of Collier et al., then, Zambia 
could now appear to be “living dangerously”: “in the long run poor but peaceful is not 
an option” (Collier et al. 2003: 108). At the same time “Clearly, the belief that 
democracy or development in themselves can guarantee peace and stability is 
erroneous” (Stewart and O’Sullivan 1999: 379). Neither of these contrasting insights 
by themselves contain all the information needed to weigh up Zambia’s future or, 
even, make sense of its past. For although this paper has emphasised a number of 
primary arguments to explain Zambia’s relative peacefulness at different times - as 
befits the changing nature of it vulnerabilities – there has been one constant force 
beneficial to peace dating even from the years before independence. This is 
Zambians’ socialisation into a culture whose character is well represented by 
Kaunda’s stricture never to ‘disinfect violence’ (Kaunda 1980: 97).  
 
As a nationalist leader Kaunda foreswore violent action; as President of the Republic 
he authorised the use of violence only sparingly, and established a range of 
institutions for conflict management and prevention. When sound judgment most 
mattered towards the end of the Second Republic, he resolved against allowing anti-
regime protest to escalate further. As defeated presidential candidate in 1991 he 
relinquished office graciously. Although unhappy about negative social and political 
developments in the country since then, his role as founder of the Kenneth Kaunda 
Peace Foundation (whose aim is help end conflict in Africa) offers a continuing 
reminder to fellow citizens of the value of their distinct tradition of peace. Kaunda’s 
personal standing in Zambia today is high. As well as being a contrast with many 
other deposed or defeated leaders that suggests his animus against political violence 
strikes a form chord throughout society. Contemporary public discourse in Zambia as 
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reflected in the press makes considerable play of the importance of preserving a 
political atmosphere that is conducive to peace. That and the popular support for 
democracy which opinion surveys show the great majority shares are entirely 
complementary and mutually reinforcing. If these features are deeply embedded in 
Zambian political culture – and there is no compelling reason to believe they are not  - 
then that provides as strong a clue as any to the country’s freedom from internal war. 
There may be no surer guarantee of lasting peace.  
  
Zambia’s past bears out that even ethnic diversity and social inequality put together 
are not sufficient to impel violent conflict, notwithstanding unsatisfactory 
development performance. It adds weight to the proposition that important 
determinants lie elsewhere, in the political culture and political institutions. In the mix 
of influences adverse to conflict an increase of political and civil liberties since the 
1980s offers something of a counterweight to the deteriorating socio-economic 
conditions – contrasting markedly with earlier years when relatively favourable 
welfare conditions helped offset the restrictions imposed on both political and civil 
society. In this context Zambia’s place in relation to the general theoretical 
proposition that an inverted u-curve plots conflict against types of regime could be 
highly significant. Put differently, the political trend from 1990 has been along the 
democracy-leaning side of the continuum that runs all the way from autocracy 
through intermediate regime types towards stable liberal democracy. As comparative 
political analysis claims that societies moving from autocracy towards some 
intermediate regime generally find it harder to maintain domestic peace, so Zambia 
draws benefit today from the fact that no period in its past was characterised by 
exclusionary politics, hard despotism or brutal dictatorship. And just as a past history 
of violent conflict appears to make some countries more prone to experience violence 
again, so the persistence of peace can be the sequel to a solid past record of avoiding 
conflict. There is no tradition of a “conflict culture” in Zambia. That is what now 
most clearly gives the country an advantage, along with some others such as Tanzania 
that have had a broadly similar historical trajectory, over neighbours like Angola and 
DRC, Zimbabwe and even Mozambique. Path-dependence is too grand and 
contentious a theoretical claim on which to end this account. But Zambia does seem 
to present an example of a country that has demonstrated a resilient and consensual 
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political will to respect the relatively peaceful legacy that it inherits from its evolving 
past. 
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Notes 
 
1. For example the following special issues: Journal of International Development, 15:4 
(2003), Journal of Peace Research, 39:4 (2002), Journal of Conflict Research, 46:1 
(2002), Journal of African Economies, 9:3 (2000). Also the two volume collection 
edited by E.W.Nafziger, F. Stewart and R. Väyrynen (2000). 
2  Goldsmith (2001: 129-30) reports deaths from political violence 1981-98 as: Angola 
750,000; DRCongo 11,000; Lesotho, 1,000; Mozambique 50,000; Namibia 25,000; 
South Africa 20,000; Zimbabwe 3,000. No figures are returned for Botswana, 
Malawi, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia. 
3. Afronet (2002) profiles eight suspicious deaths – possibly extra-judicial killings – 
where the state had some interest, between January 1994 and July 2001, including 
prominent lawyers, a former Finance Minister, and Wezi Kaunda, son of Zambia’s 
first president and likely candidate to lead the opposition United National 
Independence Party.  
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4. In an index of socio-political instability measuring more or less violent phenomena of 
political unrest, Alesina and Perotti (1996: 1211) score Zambia for 1960-85 a 
creditable minus 3.46, compared with for instance Sierra Leone at plus 9.11 and 
Sudan plus 15.09. UK was minus 7.63. 
5. Colliet et al. (2003: 53). In their econometric analysis of humanitarian emergencies 
Nafziger and Auvinen (2002) confirm the importance of economic stagnation, 
poverty and inequality; Hauge and Ellingsen’s (1998: 314) data analysis concludes 
“the level of economic development has the strongest effect on the incidence of 
domestic armed conflict as well as a relatively strong impact on the severity”. 
6 . Collier et al. (2003: 83) estimate that the typical country reaching the end of a civil 
war faces around a 44 per cent risk of returning to conflict within five years. 
7. Collier and Hoeffler (1998: 572) found polarised societies have around  a 50 per cent 
higher probability of civil war than either homogenous or highly fractionalised 
societies. 
8. “ multiethnic parties have predominated in Zambia since before independence and 
continue to do so…” Scarritt and Mozaffar (forthcoming, ms. 24).The exceptions 
were the United Party, formed in 1966 and then banned, the United Progressive Party 
(1971) and Agenda for Zambia (formed 1995),  which in the 2001 general election 
failed to win any parliamentary seats even in its home province, Western Province, 
where it polled just 1.34 per cent of votes cast.   
9. See Sandbrook (2002: 269). The United Nations Development Programme’s Human 
Development Report 2002 also argued the superior merits of democracy for managing 
conflict in non-violent ways.  
10 . Data in this paragraph from World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000.  
11 . Data from World Bank’s World Development Report various years. 
12. This view was held by 73 per cent of survey respondents reported in Bratton (1999: 
559). 
13. In terms of Collier’s earlier writings the seemingly beneficial implications of the 
declining importance to Zambia’s of its minerals exports is offset by a continuing 
inability to diversify away from primary commodities for example the growing export 
of estate-produced agricultural products. 
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